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Federal employment discrimination law is enamored with 
court-created doctrines with catchy names.1 A fairly recent addition 
to the canon is the concept of the “cat’s paw,” formally recognized 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.2 With its 
name coined by Judge Richard Posner and drawn from a fable, the 
concept of cat’s paw has taken ground quickly, discussed in 
hundreds of cases.3 
The Supreme Court recognized the cat’s paw theory in a case 
where a hospital fired a worker.  The person who made the ultimate 
decision did not have impermissible bias. However, her decision 
was influenced by information from two supervisors who arguably 
did possess such bias.4 The Court held that “if a supervisor 
performs an act motivated by [impermissible] animus that 
is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment 
action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate 
employment action, then the employer is liable.”5 Since then, courts 
have applied cat’s paw analysis under a wide range of federal 
statutes including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),  
and others.6 
This Article argues that the cat’s paw doctrine is a mistake, and 
the courts should abolish it. Before the Supreme Court recognized 
it as a separate doctrine, the Court decided numerous cases with 
facts that could now be called cat’s paw cases. The Supreme Court 
did not need or even mention the need for a new doctrine to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 
(2011) (explaining similarly situated comparators); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril,  
75 MO. L. REV. 313, 347, 357 (2010) (discussing multiple sub-doctrines); Kerri Lynn 
Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 180 (2012) (discussing stray remarks doctrine). 
 2. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
 3. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 4. Staub, 562 U.S. at 413–15, 422. By describing the facts of this case, I am not 
suggesting that a person is required to act with animus or intent to create liability under 
federal discrimination law. 
 5. Id. at 422 (footnote omitted). 
 6. See, e.g., Acosta v. Brain, 910 F.3d 502, 514 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying cat’s paw in 
ERISA retaliation context); Perkins v. Child Care Assocs., 751 F. App’x 469, 475 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(applying cat’s paw to the FMLA); Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 351  
(6th Cir. 2012) (Title VII); Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing cat’s paw in context of ADEA). 
002.SPERINO_NO_HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  10:02 PM 
1219 Caught by the Cat’s Paw 
 1221 
 
adjudicate those cases. Strangely, the Supreme Court does not cite 
any of these cases in Staub. 
Indeed, these Supreme Court cases are going to cause a judicial 
headache as lower courts try to reconcile pre-Staub jurisprudence 
with the court-created cat’s paw doctrine. The current cat’s paw 
doctrine muddles rather than elucidates complex concepts of 
intent, causation, and agency liability. 
Before cat’s paw doctrine becomes further entrenched, this 
Article provides a new and more complete history of the doctrine. 
This new history shows that courts did not need the cat’s paw 
doctrine prior to its creation. They were resolving cases that 
presented cat’s paw scenarios without any resort to the complicated 
analytical structure that now accompanies the doctrine. Even the 
Seventh Circuit decision that coined the phrase “cat’s paw” did not 
rely on cat’s paw to resolve the case.7 
Importantly, there is only one way to reconcile Staub with 
several other canonical Supreme Court cases—to read it as simply 
recognizing one set of facts under which a plaintiff could prevail 
under federal discrimination law. Some lower courts are 
interpreting Staub to place significant limits on the scope of 
discrimination law.8 However, using cat’s paw to limit the scope is 
inconsistent with numerous Supreme Court cases as well as the text 
and purposes of the discrimination statutes. 
Cat’s paw doctrine should be abolished while it is in its infancy 
because it is not needed and will likely lead to decades of confusion 
in employment discrimination jurisprudence. As it is unlikely that 
the Supreme Court will admit that Staub’s complicated holding was 
a mistake, I also suggest ways that the courts can retain the core of 
Staub while jettisoning its more problematic features. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the Staub case 
in-depth, covering its journey from the trial court to the Supreme 
Court. Part II discusses several Supreme Court cases decided both 
prior to and after Staub that fall within the ambit of what would 
now be called cat’s paw. It demonstrates that the Supreme Court 
did not need a special cat’s paw doctrine to resolve these cases. Part 
III explores the Seventh Circuit decision in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 
 
 7. Shager, 913 F.2d at 400. 
 8. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 
2016); Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 659 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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showing that even that court did not rely on cat’s paw doctrine. Part 
IV contrasts the Supreme Court cases and Shager with Staub, 
showing that it will be difficult to reconcile a restrictive cat’s paw 
doctrine with them. Part V highlights the problems federal courts 
are experiencing with cat’s paw and charts a path forward based on 
the text and purposes of the federal discrimination statutes. 
I.  THE CAT’S PAW 
The Supreme Court recognized the cat’s paw theory in Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital.9 Since Staub, there has been surprisingly little 
scholarly attention paid to cat’s paw doctrine.10 This Part provides 
an overview of the case as it made its way through the courts, 
focusing on the important doctrinal and theoretical issues 
presented at each stage. 
A. Staub at the Trial Court 
Vincent Staub sued his employer for terminating his 
employment, alleging the employer violated the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).11 
USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating or retaliating 
against service members based on their military service.12 Staub 
worked as an angio technician at a hospital. He was also a member 
of the Army Reserve. As an army reservist, Staub would miss work 
 
 9. Staub, 562 U.S. 411. 
 10. L. Camille Hébert, The Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 Labor and Employment Law 
Decisions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
279, 293 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
1431, 1432–34 (2012). Some articles briefly discuss cat’s paw theory. Matthew T. Bodie,  
The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159, 183 (2013); 
Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer Feedback into 
Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2202 (2018) (considering whether cat’s paw 
could be used to hold employers liable for using discriminatory customer feedback); Richard 
Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
1381, 1413–14 (2014) (briefly noting the causal questions cat’s paw theory invites); see also 
Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating the Scope of 
Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383,  
389–97 (2008) (discussing the competing standards established by the circuit courts of 
appeals prior to Staub). 
 11. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562 
U.S. 411 (2011). This section recounts the facts as described by the courts. The employer 
contested many of the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them. 
 12. 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2018). 
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for training and deployments, often on the weekends. After 
working for the hospital for fourteen years, the hospital terminated 
his employment. Staub filed suit, arguing that the hospital 
provided false reasons for firing him and that the real reason was 
animosity toward his military service. 
Staub presented evidence that in 2000, Janice Mulally (who the 
court described as second-in-command of the imaging department) 
began to prepare work schedules for the imaging department 
where Staub worked.13 Staub informed Mulally of his Army 
Reserve duties, which required him to attend training one weekend 
a month and for two weeks during the summer. Before Mulally 
took over scheduling, Staub did not work on the weekends; 
however, Mulally scheduled Staub for weekend work knowing 
about his Reserve duties.14 At times, Mulally would change the 
schedule to accommodate Staub’s military obligations when he 
reminded her about his drill requirements. However, sometimes 
she would tell Staub’s co-workers that volunteers were needed  
to cover his weekend shift. Occasionally, she required Staub to use 
vacation days to cover weekend shift time when he was at Reserve 
training, and she scheduled him for extra shifts without notice. 
Mulally “called Staub’s military duties ‘bullshit’ and said the extra 
shifts were his ‘way of paying back the department for everyone 
else having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for  
the Reserves.’”15 
The department head for Staub’s unit was Michael Korenchuk, 
who sometimes intervened on the scheduling issues, but never 
finally resolved them. According to the appellate court, 
“Korenchuk characterized drill weekends as ‘Army Reserve 
bullshit’ and ‘a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of 
taxpayers[’] money.’”16 
A co-worker, Amy Knoerle, reported that “Mulally would roll 
her eyes and make sighing noises” when Staub would approach her 
about his drill obligations.17 A new employee, Leslie Sweborg, 
joined the unit. She testified that two weeks into the job she met 
 
 13. Staub, 560 F.3d at 651. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 652. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Mulally and another coworker (Angie Day) for drinks after work. 
Sweborg testified that Mulally told her Staub’s “military duty had 
been a strain on the[ ] department” and “she did not like him as an 
employee.” Mulally asked Sweborg “to help her get rid of him.”18 
Sweborg refused. 
In January of 2004, Staub received a notice that he needed to 
report for duty as a precursor to an active deployment. Korenchuk 
became concerned about work coverage because, at that time, 
Sweborg and Staub were the only angio techs. In late January, 
Mulally gave both Sweborg and Staub written warnings for failure 
to help another diagnostic unit when requested. Sweborg and 
Staub both disputed the facts upon which Mulally relied to issue 
the warning, and Staub also disputed whether the two violated any 
work rule.19 As part of the warning, Staub was required to report to 
Korenchuk or Mulally when he did not have any patients and to 
remain in the general diagnostic area unless Korenchuk or Mulally 
gave him permission to go elsewhere.20 
According to the facts as stated by the appellate court, Staub’s 
problems got worse in April of 2004. The court noted: 
On April 2, 2004, Day had a meeting with Korenchuk, Linda Buck 
(vice-president of Human Resources), and R. Garrett McGowan 
(chief operating officer). Day was upset with Korenchuk because 
she complained to him about Staub and he did nothing in 
response. Day said she had difficulty working with Staub, he 
would “absent himself from the department,” and he tended to be 
“abrupt.” After Day left the room, Korenchuk, Buck, and 
McGowan discussed what they should do. This wasn’t the first 
time McGowan had heard about “availability” problems 
involving Staub, so he told Korenchuk to work with Buck to create 
a plan that would solve the issue. They never found time to do 
that—Staub ran into trouble again and was fired three weeks later 
on April 20.21 
The trouble on April 20 began when Sweborg and Staub wanted 
to go to lunch. They could not find Korenchuk, so they left a 
voicemail for him letting him know they were going to lunch.  
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 414 (2011). 
 20. Staub, 560 F.3d at 653. 
 21. Id. at 653–54. 
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When they returned thirty minutes later, Korenchuk demanded to 
know where they had been. Even though they explained that they 
were at lunch and explained they left a voicemail message, 
Korenchuk took Staub to the Human Resources office, where Buck 
told him he was fired. 
A written report indicated that the hospital fired Staub because 
he failed to comply with the conditions of the written warning. 
Buck made the decision to fire Staub with Korenchuk’s input. 
According to the appellate court, “Without the January 27 write-up, 
Day’s April 2 complaint, and the event on April 20—all of which 
involved unavailability or ‘disappearances’—Buck said she would 
not have fired Staub.”22 Buck also based her decision on past issues 
regarding Staub of which she was aware. She reviewed his 
personnel file before making her decision. She was not aware of 
potential animus by Day or Mulally related to Staub’s military 
service. Staub grieved his termination and raised the issue of 
potential military animus. Buck did not investigate this claim and 
reaffirmed her decision to terminate Staub’s employment.23 
The trial court judge denied the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment and allowed the case to go to trial. A jury heard 
Staub’s case and awarded him $57,640.00 in damages.24 
The employer filed post-trial motions, which the trial court 
denied. In considering these motions, the trial court noted that “the 
testimony and documentation about who said what to whom was 
hotly contested.”25 It emphasized that credibility determinations 
belong to a jury and that once a witness provides unreliable 
evidence, the factfinder is allowed to disbelieve other evidence 
proffered by that witness.26 The trial court judge allowed the jury 
to determine whether the defendant’s investigation was sufficient 
to break the causal chain for liability.27 
 
 22. Id. at 654. 
 23. Id. at 655. 
 24. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 04-1219, 2008 WL 2001935, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 7, 
2008), rev’d in part, 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562 U.S. 411 (2011). The 
trial in Staub was delayed while the appellate courts were considering issues related to cat’s 
paw in contemporaneous cases. Joint Appendix at 89a–90a, Staub, 562 U.S. 411 (No. 09-400), 
2010 WL 2707600. 
 25. Staub, 2008 WL 2001935, at *2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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The trial court noted that the employer raised a new cat’s paw 
issue in post-trial motions, pointing to a Seventh Circuit cat’s paw 
case decided after the trial in Staub—Metzger v. Illinois State Police.28 
In Metzger, the Seventh Circuit considered a case in which a board 
made the final decision regarding whether to increase the pay 
grade of an employee’s position.29 The worker alleged that a 
supervisor who provided the board with information about the 
employee’s work responsibilities conveyed inaccurate information 
to the board because of a retaliatory motive.30 
Without any reference to Title VII, the Seventh Circuit relied on 
its prior cases and held that the worker could not prevail. The 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Metzger is a little unclear as it appears 
to rest on two grounds. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff 
could not prevail because the board was not wholly dependent on 
the allegedly biased supervisor’s information.31 However, the court 
also noted that there was no evidence that the supervisor’s 
comments influenced the board at all.32 
The distinction between the two possible holdings is important 
because it would later affect the appellate court outcome in Staub. 
One way to read the Metzger case is that it required the plaintiff in 
a cat’s paw case to show that the biased individual had a singular 
influence on the person or body who made the decision. As 
discussed in more detail throughout this Article, such a standard is 
not based on the text of the employment discrimination statutes 
and requires the plaintiff to prove too tight a connection between a 
protected class or protected activity and an outcome. However, the 
second possible holding is more consistent with Title VII. Title VII 
requires a plaintiff to establish that a protected trait was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice.33 In retaliation cases, a plaintiff 
must establish that protected conduct was a “but for” cause of the 
 
 28. Id. at *1. 
 29. Metzger v. Ill. State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 682 (“[W]here a decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source 
of information, but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the 
decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of misinformation to  
the decision maker.” (quoting Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 918  
(7th Cir. 2007))). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
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outcome.34 If a plaintiff cannot show how her protected trait or 
protected activity influenced the outcome at all, then the plaintiff 
has failed to show causation. 
The trial court in Staub found that Metzger did not alter the 
Seventh Circuit’s prior cat’s paw jurisprudence.35 In Staub, the trial 
court judge instructed the jury using both of the standards 
discussed in Metzger. The verdict form asked the jury whether 
Staub proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his military 
status was a motivating factor in his discharge.36 However, the jury 
also received a singular influence cat’s paw instruction.37 The judge 
instructed the jury that the “[a]nimosity of a co-worker toward the 
Plaintiff on the basis of Plaintiff’s military status as a motivating 
factor may not be attributed to Defendant unless that co-worker 
exercised such singular influence over the decision maker that the 
co-worker was basically the real decision maker.”38  
In ruling on the post-trial motions in Staub, the trial judge 
appeared to be focused on two important issues: the procedural 
posture of the case and the contested nature of the facts. The trial 
judge was unsure who did what, when they did it, and how what 
they did ultimately impacted the outcome. The trial court judge 
denied the employer’s post-trial motions. 
B.  Staub at the Seventh Circuit 
The appeal centered on cat’s paw liability. The employer 
argued that the trial court judge gave improper instructions to the 
jury and improperly admitted evidence related to animus of non-
decisionmakers.39 After recounting the facts of the case in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the Seventh Circuit began framing 
the legal dispute before it. Without any citation, the appellate court 
first noted, “a plaintiff suing under USERRA does not win by 
showing prohibited animus by just anyone. He must show that 
 
 34. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013). 
 35. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 04-1219, 2008 WL 2001935, at *2 (C.D. Ill. May 7, 
2008), rev’d in part, 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
 36. Joint Appendix, supra note 24, at 68a. 
 37. Id. at 71a. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Staub, 560 F.3d at 651. 
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the decisionmaker harbored animus and relied on that animus in 
choosing to take action.”40 
As discussed in more detail below, this framing is incorrect 
because it focuses on the animus of a particular decisionmaker or 
decisionmakers, rather than the causal factors that led to an 
outcome. Under employment discrimination law, decisions to take 
employment actions (like hiring, firing, or promoting individuals) 
are the employer’s action. Employers as entities do not have animus 
in the same way that a person could. Even if we can say that an 
individual employee or group of employees made the decision, the 
action is situated at the employer or entity level. An individual 
decisionmaker has no ability to fire an employee because the 
employee is not employed by the decisionmaker; he is employed 
by the entity. Thus, the causal connection is between the protected 
status and the outcome, and not the animus of any particular 
decisionmaker to an outcome. 
One way to prove that a decision is discriminatory is to  
show that the person who made it had a discriminatory animus, 
but this is not the only way. As discussed throughout this  
Article, there is an entire body of law describing different ways to 
show that a decision was taken because of a protected trait (or in 
Staub’s case, because of his military service). The appellate court 
analysis got off on the wrong foot by misstating basic employment 
discrimination law. 
After this introduction, the court then explored whether Staub 
could prevail under a cat’s paw theory. In framing the issue, the 
appellate court again made the same mistake about animus and the 
decisionmaker. It noted, “Deploying the cat’s paw theory, Staub 
sought to attribute Mulally’s animus to Buck, and therefore to 
Proctor [the hospital].”41 When an employer takes a tangible 
employment action, employment discrimination law does not 
require the animus of a person to be attributed to the employer (the 
legal entity). Rather, the question is whether the plaintiff’s 
protected status caused the outcome. 
At the beginning of its opinion, the appellate court noted: 
 
 40. Id. at 655. 
 41. Id. 
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 One would guess that the chances are pretty slim that the work 
of a 17th century French poet would find its way into a Chicago 
courtroom in 2009. But that’s the situation in this case as we try to 
make sense out of what has been dubbed the “cat’s paw” theory. 
The term derives from the fable “The Monkey and the Cat” 
penned by Jean de La Fontaine (1621–1695). In the tale, a clever—
and rather unscrupulous—monkey persuades an unsuspecting 
feline to snatch chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns her paw in the 
process while the monkey profits, gulping down the chestnuts 
one by one. As understood today, a cat’s paw is a “tool” or “one 
used by another to accomplish his purposes.”42 
Later in the opinion, the court recited its cat’s paw standard, 
which required that the biased subordinate have a singular 
influence over the decisionmaker.43 If the decisionmaker did not 
just rely on the information provided by the subordinate, but 
conducted her own investigation and analysis, there could be no 
cat’s paw liability in the Seventh Circuit.44 
Although admitting that the trial court gave jury instructions 
that properly instructed the jury about the singular influence 
standard, the appellate court found that the trial court improperly 
introduced evidence of Mulally’s bias. The appellate court believed 
the trial court should have excluded this evidence by finding as a 
matter of law that no reasonable juror could find that Mulally 
exercised this singular influence.45 The appellate court did not grant 
a new trial, but rather took the extraordinary step of granting 
judgment in favor of the employer. 
This holding is problematic on a number of fronts. First, given 
the jury’s verdict and the instruction given, the jury did factually 
find that the military animus singularly influenced the 
decisionmaker. It is unclear why the appellate court believed it 
should second-guess this factual finding by declaring that no 
reasonable jury could so find. A reasonable jury did so find—the 
actual jury impaneled in this case. Further, the trial court judge 
believed that a jury could so find, because the trial judge allowed 
the case to go to trial and denied post-trial motions. 
 
 42. Id. at 650. 
 43. Id. at 656. 
 44. It is worth noting that there is no reference to any statutory language in the 
Seventh Circuit’s description of cat’s paw doctrine. 
 45. Staub, 560 F.3d at 658. 
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Second, the Seventh Circuit focused on the connection between 
Mulally and Buck. It ignored that the correct connection is between 
the protected trait and the outcome, thus diminishing the evidence 
presented by the plaintiff. By focusing on the “decisionmaker,” 
rather than the outcome, the appellate court appears to exclude  
the evidence that Korenchuk also exhibited bias, and that Mulally 
may have induced Day to make the original complaint that started 
the process. Indeed, when the case went to the Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Court provided additional facts about Korenchuk that are 
not contained with the appellate court’s set of facts: “that 
Korenchuk made negative remarks about Staub’s Reserve duties 
before firing him in 1998,” “that Korenchuk informed Staub of  
the revenue lost while he was on Active Duty in 2003,”  
“that Korenchuk was aware in January 2004 that Staub might be 
called to Active Duty again, and that ‘[b]udget was a big issue  
with [Korenchuk].’”46 
Third, the Seventh Circuit then continued by spinning a version 
of the facts that clearly drew inferences in favor of the employer 
and not the plaintiff. For example, the court discussed Staub’s 
alleged history of employment problems, even though the court 
failed to discuss why, if Staub was such a terrible employee, he 
remained employed at the hospital for fourteen years.47 The court 
noted that one of Staub’s recent performance reviews rated his 
performance as nearly perfect.48 The court strangely concluded that 
this prior history justified the discharge even without the more 
recent performance issues. Again, this claim is contrary to the jury 
verdict and also to the fact that Staub was a long-term employee. 
The court then also found that even though Buck’s investigation 
could have been more “robust,” it was sufficient.49 
The court then invoked the cat’s paw fable. The court used ideas 
from the fable to find that the decisionmaker’s reliance must be 
“blind reliance.”50 It is strange indeed that a court would decide a 
case based on reference to a fable, rather than by reference to the 
applicable statute. 
 
 46. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 427 n.* (2011) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 47. Staub, 560 F.3d at 659. 
 48. Id. at 652 n.2. 
 49. Id. at 659. 
 50. Id. 
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C. Staub at the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Staub to resolve a 
circuit split regarding the proper standard in cat’s paw cases.51  
The Supreme Court upheld the use of cat’s paw doctrine and 
enunciated a test to apply in some circumstances. Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion in which five other Justices joined. Justice 
Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which  
was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Kagan did not participate in 
the opinion. 
After reciting the facts, the Supreme Court provided the text of 
USERRA and noted that it is similar to Title VII.52 The Court’s 
analysis began with the statement: “[W]e start from the premise 
that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background 
of general tort law.”53 The Court then applied a tort law overlay  
to USERRA. 
The Court stated that intent requires a person to intend  
the consequences of his actions or believe that consequences are 
substantially certain to occur.54 It noted that even if Mulally and 
Korenchuk acted with discriminatory animus, they did  
not terminate Staub. Instead, they reported performance 
deficiencies. Staub presented evidence that he had not violated any 
workplace rules and that the reporting was motivated by his  
military obligations. 
Because reporting performance problems does not itself violate 
USERRA, no liability attached for the making of those reports. The 
Court assumed that submitting a negative performance review is 
 
 51. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Staub, 562 U.S. 411 (No.  
09-400), 2010 WL 3611711, at *9; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent,  
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 927 (2014). 
 52. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417. USERRA provides: “An employer shall be considered to 
have engaged in actions prohibited . . . under subsection (a), if the person’s membership . . . 
in the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the employer 
can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership . . . .”  
38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2018). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and states that such discrimination is established 
when one of those factors “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), (m) (2018).  
 53. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417; see also Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common 
Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1  [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination Statutes]; 
Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014). 
 54. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.3. 
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not cognizable on its own under USERRA. In discrimination 
jurisprudence, there is a continuing circuit split about this issue.55 
The Court continued by deciding whether the hospital could be 
held liable for the animus and actions of the two subordinate 
supervisors. It stated: “Perhaps, therefore, the discriminatory 
motive of one of the employer’s agents (Mulally or Korenchuk) can 
be aggregated with the act of another agent (Buck) to impose 
liability on Proctor.”56 The Court discussed various views of agency 
law and then somehow resolved the agency issue through 
causation. The Court stated: 
Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what the 
background rule of agency law may be, since the former line of 
authority is suggested by the governing text, which requires that 
discrimination be “a motivating factor” in the adverse action. When 
a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus on the part of 
the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report prompted 
(unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimination 
might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the 
decision; but it seems to us a considerable stretch to call it “a 
motivating factor.”57 
The lower courts are still struggling with questions about 
whether cat’s paw doctrine is about causation, agency, or both 
causation and agency. The Supreme Court rejected the standard 
suggested by the employer, that the employer is only liable if the 
decisionmaker possessed discriminatory animus.58 
As discussed below, another conceptual problem in cat’s paw 
jurisprudence is the effect of a subsequent decision or a subsequent 
investigation by a non-biased supervisor prior to making an 
employment decision. The Court distinguished independent 
judgment from a subsequent investigation. It specifically held that 
the independent judgment of a decisionmaker does not break the 
 
 55. See, e.g., Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (being rated as having unsatisfactory performance not sufficient to 
constitute an adverse action); Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F. Supp. 2d 336, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (noting that a negative evaluation can be an adverse action if it leads to a material 
adverse change in work conditions). 
 56. Staub, 562 U.S. at 418. 
 57. Id. at 418–19. 
 58. Id. at 419. 
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causal chain. The Court purported to address this problem through 
proximate cause jurisprudence. The Court noted: 
And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of judgment 
by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action 
(and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from being 
the proximate cause of the harm. Proximate cause requires only 
“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s] that 
[are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Hemi Group, LLC 
v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
and brackets omitted). We do not think that the ultimate 
decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment automatically renders the 
link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely contingent.”59 
The Court continued by noting that the decisionmaker’s 
judgment is a proximate cause of the decision, but provided that 
the common law allows for multiple proximate causes.60 It also 
indicated that the judgment is not a superseding cause because 
superseding cause only exists if it is a “cause of independent origin 
that was not foreseeable.”61  
The Court also rejected the idea that the independent judgment 
breaks the causal chain for practical and fairness reasons.  
The Court reasoned: 
Proctor’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an 
employer isolates a personnel official from an employee’s 
supervisors, vests the decision to take adverse employment 
actions in that official, and asks that official to review the 
employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action, then 
the employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts 
and recommendations of supervisors that were designed and 
intended to produce the adverse action. That seems to us an 
implausible meaning of the text, and one that is not compelled by 
its words.62 
The Court held that the mere fact that an investigation occurred 
did not relieve the employer of liability. “The employer is at fault 
because one of its agents committed an action based on 
 
 59. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 60. Id. at 420. 
 61. Id. (citing Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). 
 62. Id.  
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discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact 
cause, an adverse employment decision.”63 The Court also noted: 
“Since a supervisor is an agent of the employer, when he causes an 
adverse employment action the employer causes it; and when 
discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a 
‘motivating factor in the employer’s action,’ precisely as the  
text requires.”64 
However, the Court also recognized that an investigation might 
break the causal chain, in very limited circumstances. It held that 
the employer’s investigation must be “unrelated to the supervisor’s 
original biased action.”65 The Court also noted that under USERRA, 
the defendant would be required to prove the causal break.66 
However, the biased report remains a factor “if the independent 
investigation takes it into account without determining that the 
adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, 
entirely justified.”67 Some of the Court’s discussion regarding 
investigations is dicta, and it is not entirely clear how lower courts 
should determine when an employer investigation breaks the 
causal chain and when it does not. 
The Court ultimately held: “if a supervisor performs an act 
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor 
to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a 
proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the 
employer is liable under USERRA.”68 Turning to the facts of the 
Staub case, the Court held that the facts presented could meet the 
new standard. However, because the jury was not instructed with 
this standard, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit 
to determine whether the jury’s verdict should be reinstated or 
whether a new trial should be granted. 
The Court explicitly noted that it was not deciding a number of 
questions related to cat’s paw. It did not decide what should 
happen if the subordinate supervisor intended one outcome, but a 
different outcome resulted from a process the subordinate 
 
 63. Id. at 421. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 422 (footnote omitted). 
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supervisor started in motion.69 It also did not decide whether 
liability would occur if a co-worker (rather than a supervisor) 
possessed the required bias.70 
As discussed throughout this Article, there are many 
unanswered questions after Staub, many of which relate to how 
restrictive the cat’s paw doctrine is in limiting claims. One way to 
interpret Staub is that it merely stated one set of facts under which 
a plaintiff could prevail and that it did not intend to significantly 
limit plaintiffs’ claims. However, it is also possible to interpret 
Staub robustly to limit the circumstances under which a plaintiff 
could prevail. For example, Staub might be interpreted to limit cat’s 
paw liability to the acts of supervisors or to require the biased actor 
to intend the action that eventually occurs. Under this second 
approach, Staub creates more questions than it answers. 
II. PRE-STAUB LANDSCAPE 
One preliminary question worth answering is whether 
employment discrimination jurisprudence needs a cat’s paw 
doctrine at all. Several canonical Supreme Court employment 
discrimination cases were decided on facts that could now be 
characterized as cat’s paw cases, but which were not so 
characterized at the time. The courts were able to resolve these 
cases without any reference to cat’s paw. 
Strangely, the Supreme Court did not cite any of these cases in 
Staub. Importantly, the outcomes in these cases are inconsistent 
with Staub, if Staub is interpreted to significantly limit the evidence 
plaintiffs can submit to establish liability. 
By looking at these cases collectively, several themes emerge. 
First, there are many Supreme Court cases in which multiple 
people interacted in a process that resulted in an employment 
action against the plaintiff. Pre-Staub, the Supreme Court was  
often unconcerned about who “made” the final decision and  
about specifically tracing a biased individual’s influence to a  
final decisionmaker. 
 
 69. Id. at 419 n.2. This footnote is especially confusing because it uses the concept of 
intent, but the footnote references a portion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts relating to 
negligence law. 
 70. Id. at 422 n.4. 
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Rather, the Court was concerned with whether the outcome the 
employer allowed to happen was caused or impacted by a 
protected class. Although the plaintiff may show this by 
establishing that the person who made the decision was biased, the 
statutes do not require the plaintiff to show that the protected class 
motivated the decisionmaker. This is an important distinction in 
some cases. It is the outcome that needs to be connected to the 
protected trait. 
Second, the pre-Staub cases do not depend upon proof that a 
particular person intended an adverse action. Indeed, many of the 
cases do not even describe facts that would allow a reader to 
determine what action the allegedly biased individual intended. 
Third, many of the pre-Staub cases do not rely on the status of 
the allegedly biased individual to determine employer liability. 
And, the Supreme Court does not always identify the people 
involved in the decision or the power that they have to effectuate 
decisions.71 The Supreme Court does not use an agency analysis to 
assign liability to the employer. Rather, the employer has liability 
because it took an employment action. 
Finally, the Court does not frame its analysis in the terms of 
proximate cause, even when the facts span multiple years and 
multiple people and when it is unclear exactly how all of the 
comments and actions impact the contested outcome. 
As lower courts try to use cat’s paw doctrine after Staub, they 
will constantly be confronted with how to differentiate or integrate 
cat’s paw scenarios with these prior cases. As discussed in Part IV, 
these pre-Staub cases cannot be reconciled with a restrictive version 
of Staub because Staub reframed issues of bias, motive, cause-in-
fact, proximate cause, and agency law in ways that are not 
consistent with either the text of the federal discrimination statutes 
or the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of those concepts. 
The cases discussed below show that the courts did not need an 
elaborate cat’s paw analysis and instead prior to Staub used an 
approach that considered whether the plaintiff’s evidence taken as 
a whole demonstrated that a protected trait was connected to the 
negative outcome. 
 
 71. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989). The Court refers to people 
who submitted the evaluations as partners. 
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Importantly, this line of cases demonstrates that plaintiffs are 
not required to proceed under a cat’s paw analysis to prove their 
claims. They may proceed under any available analytical structure. 
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court considered 
whether an accountant could bring a sex discrimination claim when 
her firm did not promote her to partner.72 The Supreme Court 
described the very lengthy partnership decision-making process 
used by the accounting firm. It allowed partners at the firm to 
submit written comments about partner candidates.73 The 
Admissions Committee would then make a recommendation to the 
Policy Board to accept the candidate as a partner, put the 
application on hold, or deny partnership.74 The Policy Board then 
decided “whether to submit the candidate’s name to the entire 
partnership for a vote, to ‘hold’ her candidacy, or to reject her.”75 
The Supreme Court recounted generally how partners have 
voted related to Hopkins: “Thirteen of the 32 partners who had 
submitted comments on Hopkins supported her bid for 
partnership. Three partners recommended that her candidacy be 
placed on hold, eight stated that they did not have an informed 
opinion about her, and eight recommended that she be  
denied partnership.”76 
Multiple partners praised her performance on large projects.77 
Some criticized her for being brusque with staff members.78 The 
Supreme Court recounted the now-famous comments about Ms. 
Hopkins submitted by some of the partners. 
One partner described her as “macho”; another suggested that she 
“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third advised her to 
take “a course at charm school.” Several partners criticized her 
use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those 
partners objected to her swearing only “because it’s a lady using 
foul language.” Another supporter explained that Hopkins “ha[d] 
 
 72. Id. at 232. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 233. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed 
mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing 
lady ptr candidate.” But it was the man who, as [the district judge] 
found, bore responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons 
for the Policy Board’s decision to place her candidacy on hold who 
delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for 
partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, Hopkins should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”79 
The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can prevail on a sex 
discrimination case if she can show that her gender was the 
motivating factor for an outcome.80 The Supreme Court did not 
appear to focus on agency issues, but viewed liability as the 
employer’s direct liability.81 
The Court focused on whether the outcome was influenced by 
sex-based considerations.82 The Supreme Court noted: “a person’s 
gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her. 
Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect 
stumbling block to employment opportunities.”83 The Court also 
noted that an employer is liable under Title VII when it allows 
“gender to affect its decision-making process.”84 The Court also 
specifically stated that it was not limiting the ways that the plaintiff 
could prove her sex played a role in the employer’s decision.85 
There are several features of Price Waterhouse that are important 
to our cat’s paw discussion. First, the Supreme Court did not even 
identify who “made” the final decision, other than a “policy 
board.”86 Nor did the Court specifically trace a biased individual’s 
influence to that final decisionmaker. It did not discuss the votes of 
the individual members of the policy board or what information 
each reviewed. 
 
 79. Id. at 235 (citations omitted). 
 80. Id. at 240–41. The main opinion in Price Waterhouse is a plurality; however, some 
portions of the plurality analysis constitute a majority when combined with one or both of 
the concurring opinions. 
 81. See id. at 241–42. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 242. 
 84. Id. at 248. 
 85. Id. at 251–52. 
 86. Id. at 256. 
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In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court was not concerned 
about identifying how a particular person’s animus reached a 
particular decisionmaker and affected that person’s decision. 
Instead, the Court was broadly concerned with whether the 
outcome was caused by the protected trait. Indeed, in Price 
Waterhouse, the Court only generally connected the biased 
comments to the outcome. 
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations from 
all of the firm’s partners; that it generally relied very heavily on 
such evaluations in making its decision; that some of the partners’ 
comments were the product of stereotyping; and that the firm in 
no way disclaimed reliance on those particular comments, either 
in Hopkins’ case or in the past. Certainly a plausible—and, one 
might say, inevitable—conclusion to draw from this set of 
circumstances is that the Policy Board in making its decision did 
in fact take into account all of the partners’ comments, including 
the comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about 
women’s proper deportment.87 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in concurrence that 
requiring the plaintiff to prove that there was one definitive cause 
of an action would, “[p]articularly in the context of the professional 
world, where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on the 
basis of largely subjective criteria, . . . be tantamount to declaring 
Title VII inapplicable to such decisions.”88 
Rather, the Court was concerned with whether the outcome 
was caused or impacted by a protected class. While the Supreme 
Court did discuss motivation in Price Waterhouse, it was not a 
technical discussion of a legal concept of intent, motive, or animus. 
Rather, the discussion focused on what impacted the employer’s 
decision, not what a particular individual’s motive was.89 Gender 
affected the decision-making process even though some of the 
comments submitted were not facially based on the plaintiff’s sex 
(i.e., comments about her use of profanity).90 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence did state that 
the biased input played a substantial role in the decision. Additionally, she would have 
required that the biased input constitute direct evidence. 
 89. Id. at 252. 
 90. Id. at 251 (noting that allowing gender stereotypes to affect the process  
is discrimination). 
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Second, Price Waterhouse did not identify most of the allegedly 
biased individuals or describe what adverse action they intended. 
Indeed, some of the people who described Hopkins in stereotypical 
ways supported her candidacy.91 As discussed below, one way to 
read Staub is that the biased individual must intend a negative 
result and that same result must happen. However, in Price 
Waterhouse, there was little information about what the people  
who submitted biased comments intended, and there is evidence 
that some of those people intended a positive outcome, not a  
negative one. 
Third, even though the Supreme Court identified individuals 
with input as “partners,” it did not describe what authority these 
partners had. Indeed, from the facts, it appears that many of the 
partners only had the ability to make recommendations and not to 
take any specific actions against Ms. Hopkins. 
Finally, the Supreme Court did not use proximate cause to 
resolve Price Waterhouse. The Court did not exclude the early 
partner comments because of some notion that they were too 
distant or unconnected from the final decision to legally remain 
part of the causal chain. 
Importantly, after Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII 
to codify the idea that a plaintiff can establish discrimination by 
showing her protected class was a motivating factor in an outcome. 
That amendment allows a plaintiff to prevail by showing “that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated 
the practice.”92 This language makes a connection between the 
protected class and an outcome, not the bias of a  
particular individual. 
B. Desert Palace v. Costa 
Courts also have a difficult time reconciling cat’s paw doctrine 
with Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.93 Here is how the Supreme Court 
described the facts in that case: 
 
 91. Id. at 234. 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018). 
 93. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–96 (2003). 
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 Respondent experienced a number of problems with 
management and her co-workers that led to an escalating series 
of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of 
privileges, and suspension. Petitioner finally terminated 
respondent after she was involved in a physical altercation in a 
warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert 
Gerber. Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts 
surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a 
clean disciplinary record, received only a 5–day suspension.94 
In this case, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not 
required to provide direct evidence to prevail in a case where she 
uses motivating factor as the causal standard. Instead, the Court 
held “a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice.’”95 The Supreme Court upheld 
a jury’s verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. 
As with Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court only generally 
recounted how people were involved in the events leading up to 
the plaintiff’s termination. The Court described some as 
supervisors and some as co-workers, but it did not describe 
specifically how any of them contributed to the outcome. Nor did 
the Court describe what authority each person had. The Court did 
not discuss agency issues or proximate cause. 
The lower court decisions highlight the difficulties that courts 
will have reconciling Desert Palace and cat’s paw. The appellate 
court described differential treatment of the plaintiff by various 
individuals. These individuals held at least somewhat supervisory 
roles, though the court did not exactly know who the individuals 
were, what authority they possessed, or how their treatment led to 
the plaintiff’s termination. The Ninth Circuit en banc described a 
portion of the facts as follows: 
For example, when men came in late, they were often given 
overtime to make up the lost time; when Costa came in late—in 
one case, one minute late—she was issued a written reprimand, 
known as a record of counseling. When men missed work for 
medical reasons, they were given overtime to make up the lost 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 101. 
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time; when Costa missed work for medical reasons, she was 
disciplined. On one occasion, a warehouse supervisor actually 
suspended her because she had missed work while undergoing 
surgery to remove a tumor; only the intervention of the director 
of human resources voided this action.96 
The Ninth Circuit then continued by describing numerous 
instances in which various unnamed supervisors treated the 
plaintiff more harshly than men, mostly resulting in disciplinary 
write-ups for the plaintiff.97 
The Ninth Circuit described how the employer justified its 
termination decision relating to an altercation involving the 
plaintiff and another employee. The plaintiff presented evidence 
that the male employee shoved her against a wall. The male 
employee alleged that the plaintiff hit him, which was contested. 
Nonetheless, the company gave the male employee a suspension 
and fired the plaintiff. The company asserted that the plaintiff was 
fired because of the fight and because of her disciplinary history.98 
It is unclear whether Desert Palace is strictly a cat’s paw case. 
The plaintiff presented evidence that the person who signed the 
discharge paperwork had expressed an intention to “get rid of that 
bitch.”99 The Ninth Circuit panel recounted how three people were 
involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff, but there is no 
discussion about how they made the decision to fire the plaintiff.100 
As discussed below, there is an open question in current cat’s paw 
doctrine about whether a case fits within cat’s paw when there is 
evidence that one member of a multi-member decision-making 
team exhibits bias, but there is not evidence that the majority of the 
members were biased. Additionally, it is not clear in Desert Palace 
whether the other “decisionmakers” knew about the alleged bias of 
the other member. 
 
 96. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 
U.S. 90 (2003). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 846. 
 99. Id. at 861. 
 100. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
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The Ninth Circuit en banc never described how the final 
decision to fire the plaintiff was made and did not absolve the 
company of liability because some of the decisionmakers did not 
exhibit bias. 
At the very least, Desert Palace shows that a plaintiff can use 
disciplinary write-ups from individuals who are not final 
decisionmakers to support her claim without going through the 
hurdles imposed by a restrictive version of Staub. To use this 
evidence, a plaintiff is not required to show that a supervisor with 
animus intended an adverse action. Evidence of differential 
discipline is sufficient when the disciplinary history is used in the 
termination decision. Desert Palace also strongly suggests that if 
there is evidence that one person in a multi-member decision-
making team is biased, then cat’s paw is not the proper analysis. 
C. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products is another case that 
involves multiple inputs by multiple people.101 In that case, the 
plaintiff Roger Reeves was fired at the age of fifty-seven after 
working for his company for forty years. He worked in a 
department called the Hinge Room.102 Joe Oswalt, who was in  
his thirties, supervised the Hinge Room’s special line.103  
Russell Caldwell, aged forty-five, supervised both the plaintiff  
and Oswalt.104 
Powe Chesnut was the company’s director of manufacturing. 
Chesnut was married to the company’s president, Sandra 
Sanderson.105 In 1995, Caldwell informed Chesnut that production 
was down, and an audit found numerous timekeeping problems by 
Caldwell, Oswalt, and the plaintiff.106 According to the Court, 
“Chesnut, along with Dana Jester, vice president of human 
resources, and Tom Whitaker, vice president of operations, 
recommended to company president Sanderson that [plaintiff 
Reeves] and Caldwell be fired.”107 Sanderson fired Reeves. 
 
 101. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000). 
         102. Id. 
         103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
        106. Id. at 137–38. 
 107. Id. at 138. 
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In his age discrimination suit, the plaintiff presented evidence 
contesting any timekeeping errors. The Supreme Court held that 
this evidence of pretext was sufficient to prevail on his age 
discrimination claim because a factfinder could infer that the non-
credible reason was a pretext for age discrimination.108 The Court 
left open the possibility that in some cases evidence of pretext 
would not be sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail: 
Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has 
established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to 
reject the defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could 
conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an 
employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the 
record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only 
a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was 
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent 
evidence that no discrimination had occurred.109 
Plaintiff also presented evidence that Chesnut told him that he 
“was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower” and that 
he “was too damn old to do [his] job.”110 In addition, plaintiff 
presented evidence of Chesnut’s differential treatment of the 
plaintiff and a younger employee.111 
This case fits within the contours of what would later be called 
a cat’s paw case. Sanderson made the formal decision to fire the 
plaintiff, and there is no evidence recounted by the Supreme Court 
that she had any age-based animus. Although the Court cryptically 
noted that Chesnut was the person “behind [the] firing,”112 the 
Court did not describe how Chesnut influenced Sanderson. 
According to the Supreme Court’s account, two other individuals 
were also involved in the decision, and the Court did not provide 
any evidence that those two individuals were biased. The Court did 
not even discuss how they influenced the decision in any detail. 
Like other pre-Staub cases involving multiple decisionmakers, 
the Supreme Court in Reeves was not concerned about connecting 
 
 108. Id. at 147. 
 109. Id. at 148. 
 110. Id. at 151 (alterations in original). 
 111.  See id. 
 112. Id. at 152. 
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the bias of one person and the influence it had over another person. 
In fact, the Court provided only the broadest details about the 
unbiased individuals engaged in the decision-making process.  
In Reeves, the Supreme Court again stressed the connection between 
the protected class and the outcome.113 
Nor did Reeves focus on what adverse action Chesnut intended. 
Instead, the Court painted a broad picture of the evidence in favor 
of the plaintiff, which included differential treatment by Chesnut, 
age-related derogatory comments, and evidence that the reason the 
employer fired the plaintiff was pretext. 
The Supreme Court in Reeves did not overtly engage in any 
agency analysis about whether Chesnut’s actions can be imputed 
to the company, even though the facts strongly suggest that he did 
not individually possess the power to fire the plaintiff. The Court 
did not parse out his ability to take adverse actions or “tangible 
employment actions,” nor did it try to determine whether he was a 
supervisor in the technical sense that the company authorized him 
to take such actions. 
Finally, the Supreme Court did not use proximate cause to 
resolve the case. The Court did not even provide a detailed timeline 
about when all of the events in the case happened. Instead, the 
Court broadly considered the evidence to determine whether it 
supported the idea that age played a role in the termination. 
D. Post-Staub: University of Texas  
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar 
The Supreme Court decided University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar two years after Staub.114 Even though Nassar 
has facts that arguably fit within cat’s paw, the Court did not use a 
cat’s paw analysis to resolve the case. 
In Nassar, the plaintiff alleged that a medical school for which 
he worked discriminated against him based on his race, national 
origin, and religion.115 The plaintiff quit his job at the medical 
 
 113. Id. at 141. 
 114. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). 
 115. Id. at 345; Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-CV-1337-B, 2010 WL 
3000877, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), 
vacated, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). 
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school and sought a physician position at the medical school’s 
affiliated hospital.116 
When it appeared the hospital would extend the plaintiff an 
offer, the plaintiff quit his job at the medical school.117 He wrote a 
letter indicating that he was quitting because of religious, racial, 
and cultural bias.118 A medical school official responded negatively 
to this letter and reached out to the hospital, informing it that 
offering the plaintiff a job was inconsistent with an agreement 
between the medical school and the hospital.119 The hospital 
rescinded the offer.120 
The Supreme Court considered the plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 
This case arguably presented a cat’s paw scenario. The medical 
school official allegedly possessed the retaliatory motive. The 
separate hospital rescinded the offer. The medical school official 
did not have the power to rescind the offer made by the hospital, a 
separate entity. Instead, it could be argued that the medical school 
administrator used the hospital to retaliate against the plaintiff. 
However, like the other cases discussed in this Part, the Court 
did not use a cat’s paw analysis to resolve the case. Importantly, 
Nassar did not focus on the intent or motive of any individual. 
Rather, it focused on factual cause.121 It also focused on the 
wrongful actions of the employer, and did not use an agency 
analysis to impute liability to the employer based on the 
individuals who worked for the employer.122 The Court held that 
the required connection was between the protected activity and the 
adverse action.123 The Court did not use a proximate cause analysis. 
Importantly, even though Nassar was decided after Staub, the 
Supreme Court did not cite to Staub or use its framework to resolve 
the case. 
 
 116. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 344–45. 
 117. Id. at 344. 
 118. Id. 
        119. Id. at 345. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See generally id. 
 122. Id. at 360. 
 123. Id. at 362. 
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Prior to Staub, courts did not need or use a cat’s paw analysis to 
resolve cases that arguably fit within a cat’s paw model. Indeed, 
there are even other canonical Supreme Court cases where the 
Court did not describe who made the contested decision, only 
reiterating the parties’ contentions and evidence about the reason 
behind the decision.124 
In these cases, the Supreme Court did not locate the supposedly 
biased individual and trace his or her motive through to its 
influence on an unbiased person. Many of these cases do not 
describe in detail who made the final decision and how bias 
impacted that person. The cases do not require proof that a biased 
person intended a particular kind of adverse action. The Supreme 
Court did not rely on the status of the allegedly biased individual 
to determine employer liability. Nor did the Court rely on a 
proximate cause analysis. 
From these cases, two broad themes emerge. The Supreme 
Court did not need a separate cat’s paw doctrine to resolve them. 
Instead, the Court relied on whether there was a connection 
between the protected trait or protected activity and the outcome. 
Additionally, these cases suggest that viewing Staub to robustly 
limit discrimination claims is problematic. Indeed, as discussed in 
Part IV, it is difficult to reconcile Staub with many of these cases. 
III. A CAREFUL LOOK AT SHAGER 
The cat’s paw theory got its catchy name in the Seventh Circuit 
case, Shager v. Upjohn Co.125 Surprisingly, Shager did not actually 
rely on cat’s paw doctrine for its central holding. The cat’s paw 
discussion is dicta. 
Shager actually held that a plaintiff may get past summary 
judgment through multiple evidentiary paths and is not required 
to jump through a cat’s paw analysis. The Seventh Circuit did not 
need any theory with a catchy name to resolve the case. And, as 
discussed below, the Seventh Circuit admitted as much, repeatedly 
 
 124. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 
2008), vacated, 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 125. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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stating that the plaintiff possessed multiple kinds of evidence that 
considered individually would have been sufficient to allow the 
plaintiff to go to trial. 
Re-focusing on Shager reveals two important points. First, a 
cat’s paw theory was not necessary. Second, the Seventh Circuit 
recognized numerous kinds of evidence outside of cat’s paw that a 
plaintiff can use to survive summary judgment that must be viewed 
outside the lens of the cat’s paw doctrine. 
In Shager, the plaintiff alleged that his younger supervisor 
exaggerated his performance deficiencies and did not recognize his 
outstanding sales performance, while applying different standards 
to other, younger sales representatives.126 The employer contested 
the plaintiff’s evidence and offered evidence that it fired the 
plaintiff for performance deficiencies.127 The younger supervisor 
recommended that the plaintiff be fired to a committee that 
reviewed personnel actions.128 
In Shager, the Seventh Circuit recognized that holding an older 
worker to a higher performance standard than younger workers 
and then firing him based on the differential standard is not simply 
evidence of discrimination, it actually is age discrimination.129 No 
further evidence is necessary to establish a violation of law. Indeed, 
differential treatment is at the core of discrimination law.130 
The plaintiff also submitted evidence that the company 
replaced him with a younger worker and that the younger 
supervisor evaluated that younger employee noting, “It is 
refreshing to work with a young man with such a wonderful 
outlook on life and on his job,” though in fact the Seventh Circuit 
indicated the younger worker’s “performance had not been 
distinguished.”131 These facts also supported the plaintiff’s age 
discrimination claim. Importantly, this evidence did not involve the 
committee who reviewed the plaintiff’s termination. This evidence 
did not rely on cat’s paw. 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 400–01. 
 128. Id. at 400. 
 129. See id. at 402 (noting that the plaintiff did not even need to rely on the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext inquiry). 
 130. See generally McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding 
that disciplining white employees more harshly than others is discrimination). 
 131. Shager, 913 F.2d at 400. 
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The plaintiff also presented evidence that the younger 
supervisor said to a younger salesman, “[t]hese older people  
don’t much like or much care for us baby boomers, but there  
isn’t much they can do about it,” and that he frequently made  
comments that “the old guys know how to get around things.”132  
The Seventh Circuit noted that the trial court had improperly 
labeled these age-related comments as “stray remarks,” and that 
these comments were also evidence of discrimination.133 
The Seventh Circuit even noted that the company’s replacement 
of the plaintiff with a younger worker combined with a spurious 
reason for his termination would be enough evidence to survive a 
motion for summary judgment.134 
Shager then took a strange turn. The court turned to the 
argument of whether the committee’s decision somehow shielded 
the company from liability.135 This is strange for a number of 
reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit had already catalogued a number 
of separate evidentiary paths upon which the plaintiff could 
establish liability. Second, some of that evidence did not depend on 
the action taken by the committee. There is no evidence that the 
committee was involved in hiring a young employee and in making 
age-related remarks about that new employee’s performance. 
The Seventh Circuit in Shager appeared to struggle with how 
agency ideas intersect with employer liability. In another case, the 
Supreme Court had suggested that employers would not be liable 
for all sexual harassment that occurred in the workplace.136 
Although the Supreme Court would later address the issue of 
employer liability for sexual harassment in two cases,137 the Court 
had not decided these cases at the time the Seventh Circuit decided 
Shager. However, the Seventh Circuit was grappling with how to 
reconcile statements the Supreme Court made about agency in the 
harassment context to the facts of Shager. 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 402. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 405. 
 136. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 137. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
002.SPERINO_NO_HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  10:02 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1250 
 
The Seventh Circuit could not even decide whether it was 
discussing derivative liability or the employer’s direct liability.138 
An employer’s derivative liability would be based solely on the fact 
that it is liable for the acts of its agents. An employer’s direct 
liability would be based on the acts or omissions the employer 
allowed. Although Title VII and the ADEA do not distinguish these 
two types of liability and do explicitly allow for the employer to be 
liable for the acts of agents, the Supreme Court later made these 
distinctions important in the harassment context.139 Importantly, all 
of this discussion about agency and cat’s paw was dicta. 
It is clear from the Seventh Circuit’s discussion that it was not 
creating a threshold which all plaintiffs in cases involving a biased 
individual and a later decisionmaker must overcome. It simply 
noted that, given the facts of the case, the committee action did not 
absolve the company of liability. Then inexplicably, the Seventh 
Circuit stated, “If the Career Path Committee was not a mere rubber 
stamp, but made an independent decision to fire Shager, not only 
would there be no ground for finding willful misconduct by [the 
employer], there would be no ground for finding even an innocent 
violation of the Act.”140 This sentence is unconnected from the prior 
discussion about agency, but it is from this one sentence that much 
of the later mischief follows. 
The Seventh Circuit implied that once an employee is singled 
out for negative treatment based on biased information, a 
subsequent decisionmaker could somehow make an independent 
decision that justified the negative outcome. This ignores that, in 
many instances, the ultimate decisionmaker would not be making 
any decision at all without the biased input and that singling out 
the employee for further scrutiny because of a protected class is  
also discriminatory. 
Although Shager is often cited as a cat’s paw case,141 this is 
inaccurate. A careful review of Shager reveals important insights 
that courts need post-Staub to determine how and whether to apply 
a robust cat’s paw analysis. First, not all evidence in cases with a 
biased person and a later decisionmaker is evidence related to cat’s 
 
 138. Shager, 913 F.2d at 404. 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018). See generally supra note 136. 
 140. Shager, 913 F.2d at 406. 
 141. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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paw. In Shager, some of the evidence did not involve the committee 
or its recommendation at all. Second, the Seventh Circuit in Shager 
identified multiple ways for the plaintiff to survive summary 
judgment that did not involve a cat’s paw analysis, including 
evidence of differential treatment, pretext, and the hiring of a 
younger worker to replace the plaintiff. Third, Shager did not hold 
that if a case cannot survive a cat’s paw analysis then it is not viable. 
Most importantly, the court that coined the phrase “cat’s paw” did 
not rely on cat’s paw to resolve the case. 
IV. RECONCILING STAUB 
The only way to reconcile Staub with the other cases discussed 
in this Article is to either re-imagine their facts or to abandon cat’s 
paw as a separate doctrine with any restrictive, independent 
content. I argue that the better path is to abandon cat’s paw as a 
separate doctrine and instead re-frame the inquiry using the 
parameters of the statutory text, which allow a plaintiff to prevail 
by connecting her protected trait to a negative outcome.142 If the 
courts are unwilling to abolish cat’s paw, then Shager shows how 
cat’s paw can be greatly diminished. 
Under Staub, “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by 
[impermissible] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause 
an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause 
of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.”143 
One way to read Staub is that it is just expressing one way to  
prove a discrimination claim and that its words of limitation  
are meaningless. 
In other words, even though the Supreme Court left open the 
question of whether co-workers could be the biased actors, the 
Court did not mean that the doctrine only applies when a 
supervisor is involved. Co-workers can start the sequence of events, 
as can others who do not have supervisory power, such as 
customers. Likewise, the words in Staub that require the supervisor 
to intend an adverse action are also not words of limitation.  
The plaintiff can prevail by showing the facts as stated in Staub, but 
there are also other ways the plaintiff can prevail. For example, the 
 
 142. This is not the only way a plaintiff could prevail under the statute. 
 143. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
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plaintiff might be able to prevail if she shows that the biased 
individual intended one result and another result happened.  
And, the plaintiff can prevail if the biased individual did not intend 
any particular result, but an adverse outcome resulted. 
Currently the lower courts are struggling with these questions: 
who can start the sequence of events, what that person must intend, 
how the person who initiates the sequence must interact with 
others, and how the initial impetus must impact the outcome?144 
The answers to these questions vary widely right now. 
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
Courts are grappling with Staub, but they fail to realize that, 
unless cat’s paw is almost meaningless as a separate doctrine, it is 
difficult to reconcile with Price Waterhouse. Recall that in Price 
Waterhouse, the Court addressed a woman’s claim that Price 
Waterhouse denied her partnership based on the biased input of 
numerous individuals.145 In Price Waterhouse, the Court allowed the 
plaintiff to submit evidence from a wide range of people, and, other 
than describing these individuals as partners, the Court did not 
describe whether the partners had any supervisory power over  
the plaintiff.146 
If the Court ultimately holds that supervisory status is required, 
the question about who counts as a supervisor is going to be tricky. 
In another context, the Court has held that a supervisor is a person 
who has the ability to take a tangible employment action.147 A 
tangible employment action is a term of art in employment 
discrimination law that is reserved for relatively serious outcomes, 
like failure to hire, termination, or failure to promote.148 However, 
this definition does not make sense in the cat’s paw scenario 
because if the supervisor had the power to take the negative action, 
a cat’s paw analysis would typically be unnecessary. The biased 
 
 144. See cases discussed infra Section V.B. 
 145. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232–33 (1989). 
 146. Id. at 233. 
 147. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). In Vance, the Court considered 
whether a person who could make some day-to-day decisions about the plaintiff’s work 
counted as a supervisor, if the person did not have the power to terminate the plaintiff.  
Id. at 425–26. 
 148. Id. at 431. 
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individual would just fire or demote the plaintiff and would not 
need the unbiased individual to take the action. 
But if supervisor status remains as a required element for cat’s 
paw liability, then it is very unlikely that every partner who 
submitted biased information about the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse 
could be classified as her supervisor. Indeed the expert testimony 
in the case suggested that some of the negative feedback came from 
partners “who knew Hopkins only slightly.”149 Unless the courts 
view Staub as simply expressing a way that a plaintiff can prevail, 
they will have a difficult time explaining which partner comments 
counted towards Hopkins’s claim against Price Waterhouse and 
which did not count. Of course, this leads to additional questions: 
why would courts want to make these formal distinctions at all, and 
how could courts ground such distinctions in the text or purpose of 
the federal discrimination statutes. 
Further, some of the negative comments about Hopkins appear 
to be based on staff complaints about her.150 Under current cat’s 
paw doctrine, it is unclear what would happen if a supervisor 
passes along the biased complaints of non-supervisors. This issue 
gets complicated because the supervisor who passes along 
comments could be biased himself or could be passing along 
complaints about women, but not similar comments about men. 
The supervisor could just be passing the complaints along, without 
recognizing that they might be based on differential expectations 
about how men and women should behave; that is, that women 
should be nice, but that men are not expected to be nice. The 
supervisor might also equally pass along similar complaints about 
men. A restrictive cat’s paw doctrine does not precisely describe 
what should happen in such a scenario, although the Court in Price 
Waterhouse did not feel the need to address this at all. Thus, Price 
Waterhouse militates against a view of the cat’s paw doctrine that 
requires supervisory status as an element. 
A restrictive version of the cat’s paw doctrine also appears to 
require the “biased” individual to intend a negative action. In Staub, 
the Court held that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by 
antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an 
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of 
 
 149. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 150. Id. 
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the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.”151 
However, in Price Waterhouse, though some people wanted the 
plaintiff to be promoted to partner, they still submitted negative 
information about the plaintiff that may have been founded on 
stereotypes of differential expectations between men and 
women.152 Nonetheless, the stereotyped comments negatively 
impacted the plaintiff. Cat’s paw doctrine, as enunciated in Staub, 
does not currently anticipate this set of events. It is unclear what 
should happen under Staub if a supervisor who otherwise supports 
an employee and wants the employee to succeed, passes along 
biased, negative information that ultimately contributes to a 
negative outcome. 
Additionally, Price Waterhouse did not carefully connect what 
each partner intended with the ultimate outcome. Some of the 
partners recommended that the firm deny Hopkins partnership, 
others wanted Hopkins to become a partner, some indicated they 
did not have enough information to state an opinion about her 
partnership, and still others submitted an evaluation without 
making any kind of indication about how that evaluation should 
factor into her candidacy.153 In Price Waterhouse, the Court did not 
seem to believe that such information was relevant to determining 
whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. 
However, a restrictive view of Staub seems to require a court to 
discern which people intended a negative outcome. 
Further, Price Waterhouse did not use a proximate cause 
analysis. Indeed, to the extent that Staub suggests that a proximate 
cause analysis is required in cat’s paw cases, the proximate cause 
would need to be broad enough to encompass facts similar to Price 
Waterhouse, which embrace a wide range of comments, from a wide 
range of people, over a long period of time, and from multiple 
decision-making bodies. 
The Supreme Court also did not frame Price Waterhouse in terms 
of agency analysis. The Court did not find biased individuals who 
 
 151. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 152. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (“Another supporter explained that Hopkins 
ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an 
authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner] candidate.”  
(first alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 153. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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were sufficient agents of the employer and base liability on that 
derivative liability. Instead, it appeared to hold the company liable 
for the outcome by aggregating all the acts of the employees with 
the employer’s own failure to prevent bias and stereotypes from 
infecting its process for selecting partners. 
Price Waterhouse also points to another problem with cat’s paw. 
Some of the comments were clearly sexist. Others were not facially 
sexist but reflected sex stereotypes, and still other comments were 
negative but may or may not have reflected stereotypes. Now that 
cat’s paw doctrine exists, a question remains about how to reconcile 
it with this set of facts. Does Price Waterhouse fall outside cat’s paw 
because some of the comments were clearly based on the plaintiff’s 
sex? Is the court required to apply cat’s paw analysis to the 
comments that are not facially based on sex? Cat’s paw doctrine 
invites this kind of further discussion, but it is a discussion not 
worth having. Price Waterhouse already provides a workable way 
forward, especially given that Congress largely codified that 
framework in the 1991 amendments to Title VII. 
B. Desert Palace v. Costa 
If cat’s paw is a restrictive, separate doctrine, it also will be hard 
to reconcile it with Desert Palace.154 In that case, the Supreme Court 
only generally described an escalating series of problems between 
plaintiff and her co-workers and management.155 Recall that the 
Court described the facts as follows: 
 Respondent experienced a number of problems with 
management and her co-workers that led to an escalating series 
of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of 
privileges, and suspension. Petitioner finally terminated 
respondent after she was involved in a physical altercation in a 
warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert 
Gerber. Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts 
surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a 
clean disciplinary record, received only a 5–day suspension.156 
 
 154. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 155. Id. at 95–96. 
 156. Id. 
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Like Price Waterhouse, the Court does not recount who had the 
required bias, what supervisory authority those individuals 
possessed, or what each one of them intended. The Court does not 
discuss agency issues or proximate cause. 
Importantly, much of the evidence in Desert Palace related to 
disciplinary write-ups given to the plaintiff over a long period of 
time by various individuals.157 It is not clear that when a supervisor 
gives a person a disciplinary notice that the supervisor intends to 
have the person fired (the end result in Desert Palace). Given how 
many write-ups were given to the plaintiff Costa, it does not even 
appear to be substantially certain that a write-up would lead to 
termination. However, whether the supervisors intended for Costa 
to be fired or not, the write-ups played a role in her ultimate 
termination. The company stated that it fired her because of both 
the fight and her disciplinary history.158 
One reading of Staub appears to suggest that the biased 
individual must intend the outcome that later happens. The lower 
courts are considering this issue.159 However, requiring a plaintiff 
to prove that the biased individual intended the outcome would be 
at odds with the facts of Desert Palace. Desert Palace suggests that it 
is enough if the biased negative action played a role in the outcome, 
whether the individual intended a particular outcome or not. The 
Court did not describe how each of the incidents in the disciplinary 
history contributed to the outcome and what each person in the 
disciplinary chain intended as the outcome.160 
Additionally, much of the evidence in Desert Palace related to 
differential treatment of the plaintiff compared to the men with 
whom she worked.161 As discussed throughout this Article, it is not 
clear how such evidence intersects with a cat’s paw analysis.  
Differential treatment because of a protected trait is discrimination, 
whether it presents as a cat’s paw scenario or not. 
As mentioned earlier, Desert Palace is not strictly a cat’s paw 
case because the plaintiff presented evidence that the person who 
signed the discharge paperwork had expressed an intention to “get 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 96. 
 159. See, e.g., Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 352 n.11 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 160. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95–96. 
 161. See generally Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002)  
(en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
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rid of that bitch.”162 However, three people were involved in the 
decision to terminate Costa, and the Court did not describe in detail 
how these three reached their decision.163 This raises all sorts of 
questions about cat’s paw analysis. Does cat’s paw not apply if any 
person along the causal chain who also has the power to take an 
adverse action is biased? What happens if the other people in the 
causal chain who also had that power were not biased and were not 
influenced by any prior biased input? Does it matter what the 
relationship among the people looks like? 
The answers to these questions require a very precise parsing 
of who had what power and how that power was exercised. The 
endless variations of how multiple people can reach an outcome 
will wreak havoc on cat’s paw analysis. For example, will cat’s paw 
apply if one member of a multi-member panel is biased, but the 
panel has an unbiased chairperson who can veto the 
recommendations of the group? What happens if the biased panel 
member presents information to the group but recuses himself 
from the voting process regarding the plaintiff? The parade of 
variables is endless. It is difficult to reconcile a restrictive view of 
cat’s paw analysis with Desert Palace. 
C. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.  
Similar problems exist reconciling a restrictive version of the 
cat’s paw doctrine with Reeves. 
In Reeves, at least four people were involved in the decision to 
fire the plaintiff.164 The Supreme Court did not provide any facts 
suggesting that three of the four people were acting because of the 
plaintiff’s age. The Supreme Court did not really describe the 
decision-making process in detail. It noted that Chesnut (the 
allegedly biased individual), along with a vice president of human 
resources and a vice president of operations, recommended to the 
company president that the company should fire the plaintiff.165  
It is not clear what power Chesnut had compared to the others. 
 
 162. Id. at 861. 
 163. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit panel did address the multi-member 
decision-making aspect of Desert Palace. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 888  
(9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003) (identifying “one of three [alleged] decisionmakers in Costa’s termination”). 
 164. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 138 (2000). 
 165. Id. 
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It could be argued that Reeves fits nicely within the current cat’s 
paw doctrine because the Supreme Court noted that Chesnut was 
the person “behind [the] firing.”166 However, it is not clear from the 
Supreme Court’s description in what way he was “behind the 
firing.” More detail is required here because in many cat’s paw 
cases, the plaintiff is alleging that the biased person was really 
“behind the firing.” 
Additionally, Reeves presents another complicating factor. 
Chesnut was married to the company president, who ultimately 
made the final decision to fire the plaintiff. Does this relationship 
change cat’s paw analysis in any way? For example, imagine a 
slightly different scenario where Chesnut was the plaintiff’s co-
worker and did not possess any supervisory authority. Now 
imagine, this co-worker Chesnut was married to the company 
president and made false reports about the plaintiff’s work because 
of the plaintiff’s protected class. If cat’s paw analysis is ultimately 
going to distinguish liability between co-workers and supervisors, 
then the doctrine will need to contend with co-workers who have 
special relationships with people in power, including familial and 
sexual relationships. 
Recall also that the plaintiff in Reeves relied on multiple kinds 
of evidence to support the outcome. In addition to age-related 
comments, the plaintiff also relied on evidence that the reason 
given for his termination was incorrect or not true.167 He also 
presented evidence of Chesnut’s differential treatment of the 
plaintiff and a younger individual. It is not clear how cat’s paw 
intersects with other evidentiary paths. 
Additionally, to the extent that cat’s paw is about agency, it will 
need to create an agency analysis that is compatible with Reeves. 
The facts of the case strongly suggest that the allegedly biased 
individual did not possess the power to fire the plaintiff. The Court 
did not parse out his ability to take “tangible employment actions,” 
nor did it try to determine whether he was a supervisor in the 
technical sense that the company authorized him to take such 
actions. Finally, any proximate cause analysis would need to 
contend with the facts of Reeves. 
 
 166. Id. at 152. 
 167. Id. at 148. 
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D. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar 
Nassar also points to additional questions related to a restrictive 
cat’s paw analysis. Recall that in Nassar, a person working for the 
medical school reached out to a separate entity (the hospital), and 
the hospital rescinded the job offer.168 
Nassar strongly suggests that cat’s paw analysis works across 
multiple entities.169 If so, it is unclear why the biased actor would 
need to be a supervisor. In many instances, the second entity would 
not be in a position to know or understand the power that the 
biased actor was exerting. For example, imagine a biased human 
resources professional gives a negative report to a potential 
employer who calls to ask about a person’s job performance. The 
potential employer decides not to hire the individual. In this 
scenario, it is unclear why it would matter if the human resources 
professional was a supervisor in any sense. To the extent that cat’s 
paw doctrine is about agency, this scenario raises questions about 
apparent authority and whether it would be a separate basis for 
holding the employer liable. 
Nassar also begs the question of whether the second entity in 
the cat’s paw could be liable for retaliation. The basic structure of 
cat’s paw analysis suggests that the second employer might be 
liable because it allowed itself to be used as the tool of another (the 
employee of the first employer), who may have been acting for 
retaliatory reasons. 
E. Reconciling Staub with Shager 
Reconciling Staub and Shager also poses hurdles for a restrictive 
cat’s paw doctrine. These relate to two overarching questions. First, 
does cat’s paw apply when some of the evidence is not part of a 
cat’s paw, in that it is not part of a biased individual influencing 
another person? Second, how should a court differentiate cat’s paw 
evidence from other types of evidence that on their own may be 
sufficient to establish liability without relying on the cat’s paw? 
Cat’s paw doctrine appears to apply in cases where one person 
is influencing another or an outcome. However, not all evidence 
that supports a finding of discrimination rests on this relationship. 
 
 168. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 345 (2013). 
 169. Id. at 350–51. 
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Recall that in Shager, some of the evidence did not involve the 
committee or its recommendation at all. Instead, the plaintiff 
presented evidence that the company hired a younger person to 
replace him and then treated that new hire more favorably.170 
This presents a wrinkle for cat’s paw doctrine. Does a case fit 
within cat’s paw if only some of the evidence relies on a cat’s paw 
relationship? If so, it only makes sense to evaluate the cat’s paw 
evidence through the lens of cat’s paw doctrine. How would a court 
weigh other evidence of discrimination that does not depend on the 
cat’s paw relationship? In many cases, existing employment 
discrimination jurisprudence would allow a plaintiff to get to a jury 
and ultimately prevail on this evidence alone. 
Additionally, even evidence that fits within the parameters of 
cat’s paw is sufficient on its own to establish discrimination without 
the trappings of the cat’s paw analysis. In Shager, the Seventh 
Circuit determined that the plaintiff had presented multiple 
streams of evidence, each of which on its own would have been 
sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail.171 The Seventh Circuit focused 
on evidence of differential treatment and pretext, both of which are 
sufficient under current discrimination law to establish 
discrimination.172 If courts assert a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine, 
they will need to answer endless questions about how the doctrine 
affects other ways that a plaintiff may prove discrimination. In 
Shager, cat’s paw is an afterthought, not the primary lens through 
which the court viewed the evidence. 
This Part shows that it is difficult to reconcile a restrictive cat’s 
paw analysis with a wide swath of Supreme Court employment 
discrimination jurisprudence or with the case that named cat’s paw 
as a separate doctrine.173 
 
 170. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 171. Id. at 400–02. 
 172. Id. 
 173. In addition to the cases discussed in this Article, there are other Supreme Court 
cases that may also raise cat’s paw issues because the Supreme Court described the case in 
general terms, but lower courts described the cases in ways that suggest cat’s paw issues. 
See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en 
banc granted, vacated, 321 F.3d 1203 (6th Cir. 2003), and district court aff’d, 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 
2004), aff’d, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (noting that the first action taken against a plaintiff by a 
supervisor came after complaints from three non-supervisors, suggesting a cat’s paw issue). 
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V. ABANDON CAT’S PAW 
Reconciling a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine with past Supreme 
Court case law is impossible. This Part pulls together an overview 
of the questions a court must answer to reconcile cat’s paw with 
existing case law. The sheer number of questions suggests that 
continuing to develop a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine is a mistake. 
Instead, courts should recognize that evidence of discrimination 
can take many forms across many relationships and that the key 
question in many cat’s paw scenarios is causation. 
The courts could accomplish this in many ways. The most 
forthright way would be to admit that labeling some scenarios as 
“cat’s paw” cases and creating a doctrine around it was simply a 
mistake. In the courts’ haste to recognize that a particular set of facts 
might constitute discrimination, the courts unnecessarily created a 
doctrine that appeared to limit those claims. The courts could also 
retain cat’s paw, but then hold that Staub did not intend to place 
limits on it. 
A. Unanswered Questions 
Developing a restrictive cat’s doctrine is problematic because it 
will involve the courts in an avalanche of issues that are not 
required by the texts or purposes of the federal discrimination 
statutes. This section pulls together many of the questions that the 
courts would need to answer to try to reconcile cat’s paw with the 
Supreme Court cases discussed in this Article. 
One line of questions relates to the status of the biased 
individual. The lower courts are currently struggling with 
problems such as these: 
• Can co-workers start the chain of events?174 
• Can subordinates of the plaintiff start the chain of events?175 
• Can customers or others who are not supervisors or  
co-workers start the chain of events?176 
 
 174. Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(applying an agency analysis to consider liability for co-worker input). 
 175. Smith v. Comhar, Inc., 722 F. App’x 314, 318 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the circuit 
has never decided whether cat’s paw theory could apply when allegedly biased individuals 
were subordinate to the plaintiff). 
 176. Daniel v. Sargent & Lundy, L.L.C., No. 09 C 7206, 2012 WL 874419, at *11 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 14, 2012). 
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Co-worker status may be important in some cases because it 
may point to a problem with causation. The co-worker’s actions 
may be so far removed from the decision that no reasonable jury 
would find that the co-worker’s bias caused the outcome. In many 
(but not all) instances, a co-worker’s input would be farther 
removed from an outcome than a supervisor’s input would be. 
However, because the Court enshrined the concept of “supervisor” 
into cat’s paw (and left open the question of what happens with  
co-worker bias), lower courts are diverted into believing that  
co-worker/supervisor status might be the relevant issue, rather 
than causation. 
If the courts draw a line about what kinds of status create 
liability, then the courts will need to create a doctrine to define who 
falls within each status. For example, if the courts claim that only 
supervisors can create a cat’s paw, they will need to define what 
“supervisor” means. The Court has already defined “supervisor” 
in the harassment agency context; however, the court-created 
definition is still ambiguous and does not fit well with what 
reasonable workers would believe the term means.177 
Additionally, the harassment agency definition of “supervisor” 
requires the supervisor to be able to take a tangible employment 
action or that the employer essentially delegate this authority to the 
individual by relying on her input.178 This definition does not work 
well in the cat’s paw context. If the biased individual possessed the 
authority to take tangible employment actions, the biased 
individual could just take the action and would not need to 
encourage others to take it. The courts would need to define 
“supervisor” in at least two different ways: one for purposes of 
harassment/agency doctrine and the other for purposes of cat’s 
paw. Given that the word “supervisor” does not even appear in the 
federal discrimination statutes, it seems strange to develop two 
different definitions of “supervisor.” 
Further, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in the 
harassment/agency context, any definition of supervisor is likely 
to be unsatisfactory given the infinite variety in the workplace.179 
 
 177. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431 (2013). 
 178. See, e.g., Cole v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 4:11CV-118-JHM, 2014 WL 2612561, 
at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 11, 2014) (trying to navigate various definitions of supervisor). 
 179. Vance, 570 U.S. at 454, 464–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Employers allow many different people with many different titles 
to make workplace decisions. Creating a rule that is flexible enough 
to draw the proper line is extraordinarily difficult. 
Even if the courts were willing to navigate all of these problems, 
there would still be unanswered questions. Recall that in Price 
Waterhouse, some of the partners appeared to be passing along 
critiques of the plaintiff’s performance given to them by staff when 
the partner had little contact with the plaintiff. It is unclear whether 
courts would count this conduct as the conduct of the supervisor or 
the conduct of the non-supervisory staff. 
It also is unclear whether a person is a supervisor for purposes 
of cat’s paw if they possessed power to take some actions, but not 
the contested action. For example, some employers may allow 
certain people to participate in hiring decisions, but have different 
people make termination decisions. If a supervisor only has  
the power to hire, is that person a supervisor if the plaintiff  
contests a termination? 
Even if the courts could define the status of participants in the 
cat’s paw, there would be many sets of facts that would not fall 
neatly within the defined categories. For example, if the courts 
decide that a co-worker cannot create cat’s paw liability, the  
courts may need to create a different rule for co-workers who have  
special relationships with the decisionmaker, such as family or  
sexual relationships. 
The courts are also going to need to figure out what the 
“biased” individual needs to intend. Staub’s cat’s paw doctrine was 
created in a fact scenario where there was evidence suggesting the 
biased individual wanted to get the plaintiff fired and the employer 
fired the plaintiff.180 However, many of the Supreme Court cases 
discussed in this Article do not recount what the “biased” 
individual intended. Indeed, in Price Waterhouse, some of the people 
that supported the plaintiff’s candidacy submitted sex-based 
comments about her performance.181 Further, the biased individual 
may work for one employer and pass along information to another 
employer. Is the first employer liable when it could not effectuate 
the intended result? Is the second employer liable for using  
the information? 
 
 180. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011). 
 181. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989). 
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And, there are fact scenarios where a biased individual may 
intend one consequence and another consequence occurs.  
For example, the biased supervisor may want to get the plaintiff 
fired, but the company retains her and denies her a later promotion.  
Or the biased individual may want to discipline the plaintiff, but 
she is fired instead. Likewise, there may be many instances where 
there is no way to credibly determine what the supervisor intended 
in a specific sense. 
The courts also must figure out how biased input would affect 
decision-making processes that have multiple tiers or involve 
multiple people. What if only some of the people in the process 
receive the biased information? For example, what happens if an 
employer designates a three-person committee to determine 
whether to fire individuals? A supervisor reports biased 
information to one member on the committee, but the other two 
individuals do not receive the information in any way. The other 
two individuals vote to terminate the employee based on 
completely separate information. What happens if two of the 
members receive the biased information, but the third member 
does not? What if one member of the committee has more formal 
power than others on the committee? If cat’s paw doctrine develops 
in a restrictive way, courts will need to determine how an endless 
variety of factual scenarios fit within it. 
Even if the courts can define the required relationship and what 
is intended, the courts will need to define whether certain fact 
scenarios simply fall outside of cat’s paw analysis. For example, 
what if a supervisor passes along information that facially conveys 
that the protected trait played a role in the decision, and the 
ultimate decisionmaker relies on it? This should fall outside the 
reach of cat’s paw. It is likely that comments that convey 
stereotypes might also fall outside of the cat’s paw. Additionally, if 
a decisionmaker relies on information from a person that the 
decisionmaker knows to be biased, this also does not seem to fit 
well in the cat’s paw paradigm. But, defining what fits in and what 
fits outside of cat’s paw will be an impossible task.182 
Additionally, what if the biased person has the power to take 
the action, but chooses to have others make the employment 
 
 182. Courts have had similar difficulties defining the difference between direct and 
circumstantial evidence. 
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decision? For example, what if a biased person is part of a multi-
member decision-making group, submits information to that 
group, but then recuses himself from the decision-making? It is 
unclear if this is a cat’s paw scenario. Staub does not fully anticipate 
that people with power may try to get others to carry out an action. 
Courts also would need to decide how to handle cases that 
present evidence beyond just cat’s paw evidence. All evidence of 
discrimination cannot be analyzed under the cat’s paw doctrine 
because the cat’s paw structure does not work for all kinds of 
evidence. Reconciling cat’s paw with all of the different analytical 
structures that the courts use to evaluate discrimination claims is a 
decades-long project. 
Staub also inserts a proximate cause analysis into cat’s paw 
doctrine. Creating a proximate cause doctrine that is consistent 
with all past Supreme Court employment discrimination case law, 
as well as the text and purposes of the statute, is not only daunting 
but unnecessary. Title VII existed for more than forty years without 
any need for proximate cause analysis. Indeed, as I discuss 
extensively in prior work, the statute itself performs the work of 
proximate cause by defining the people protected by it, the entities 
liable for discrimination, and defenses and affirmative defenses  
to liability.183 
Finally, to the extent that cat’s paw doctrine represents the 
courts’ struggles with agency analysis, the emerging doctrine will 
need to be reconciled with all past Supreme Court cases that have 
an agency component.184 No easy task. 
B. The Path Forward 
As shown in the prior section, the parade of variables is endless. 
Courts cannot credibly resolve cat’s paw cases through an elaborate 
set of rules. If they try to do so, the rules will be subject to so many 
exceptions and exceptions to exceptions that they will be useless. 
 
 183. See generally Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 53 (discussing how 
proximate cause in statutes cannot typically be coterminous with common law  
proximate cause). 
 184. See also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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Additionally, a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine would be at odds with 
prior Supreme Court precedent.185 
Further, it is likely the courts would start drawing factual 
conclusions from specific scenarios, even though the conclusions 
are not supported by the lived reality of workers. For example, the 
courts might start opining that workers are not harmed when a co-
worker falsely reports negative conduct to a supervisor because the 
co-worker does not have official authority over the individual. This 
would be formalism at its worst. 
More importantly, any restrictive cat’s paw doctrine would 
stray far from the text or purposes of the federal discrimination 
statutes. Title VII is the cornerstone federal employment 
discrimination statute. Title VII prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against a worker because of race, sex, national 
origin, color, or religion.186 Title VII’s main operative provision 
consists of two subparts. Under the first subpart, it is an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to do the following: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or  
national origin.187 
Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer 
to do the following: 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.188 
These two subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.189 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) contains 
 
 185. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–96 (2003); Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
 187. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 188. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 189. As stated earlier, Congress amended Title VII in 1991. However, this does not 
change the fact that the foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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similar main language,190 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) contains similar concepts, although not always stated in the 
same language.191 
The text of the federal discrimination statutes does not absolve 
an employer of liability when non-supervisors discriminate. Yet, it 
is unclear whether Staub requires the factfinder to determine 
whether a supervisor intended an outcome because of a protected 
trait and the negative outcome resulted from the supervisor’s act.192 
One way to read Staub is that it is just expressing one way to prove 
a discrimination claim and that its words of limitation  
are meaningless. 
In other words, even though the Court left open the question of 
whether co-workers could be the biased actor, the Court did not 
mean to limit the doctrine in this way. Co-workers can start the 
sequence of events, as can others who do not have supervisory 
power, such as customers. Likewise, the words in Staub that require 
the supervisor to intend an adverse action are also not words of 
limitation. This is just one way that the plaintiff can prevail, but 
there are others. For example, the plaintiff might be able to prevail 
if she shows that the biased individual intended one result and 
another result happened. And, the plaintiff can prevail if the biased 
individual did not intend any particular result but an adverse 
outcome resulted. 
It is difficult to reconcile any other outcome with the language 
of the discrimination statutes. The statutes do not use words like 
supervisor, co-worker, or decisionmaker. Instead, they place 
liability for discrimination on the employer.193 
The statutes do not require that bias exist or that it be exhibited 
in any particular way. The statutes do not contain the term  
“adverse action.” Although the statutes do allow a protected class 
to be taken into account in limited circumstances, they do not allow 
employers to escape liability by conducting investigations or 
exercising independent judgment, as long as the protected trait 
caused the outcome. 
 
 190. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018). 
 192. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011). 
 193. Section 1981 allows for individual liability. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018). 
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The statutes do not contain the words “proximate cause.” Even 
if the causal language in the statutes is assumed to contain a 
proximate cause analysis, this statutory proximate cause could not 
be coterminous with common law proximate cause.194 At the very 
least, the courts would be required to defer to the statutory text 
itself in determining the limits of liability under the federal 
discrimination statutes, and there is a strong argument that 
Congress already considered the outward reach of the statutes 
when it chose to limit the people protected by the statutes, the 
entities liable for discrimination, and exceptions to liability. 
A restrictive cat’s paw doctrine is also at odds with the 
underlying purposes of the discrimination statutes. The Court has 
repeatedly reiterated, “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in 
employment.”195 Courts also frequently note the broad, remedial 
purpose of the discrimination statutes.196 
It is difficult to reconcile a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine with the 
text and purposes of the discrimination statutes, or with numerous 
Supreme Court cases. Given the confusion that using the words 
“cat’s paw” invites, it is best to abandon the doctrine completely. 
Cat’s paw simply is not a different type of liability that requires its 
own terms of art and analytical structure. 
However, if the Court does not want to abandon cat’s paw, it 
can simply indicate that Staub did not limit the factual 
circumstances under which a plaintiff can prevail. This choice is 
realistic because the Court has done it numerous times. In fact, 
employment discrimination jurisprudence is in constant flux 
because the Court issues ambiguous legal standards that it then 
needs to clarify and re-clarify over time.197 
 
 194. See generally Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 53 (discussing how 
Congress often places language limiting liability in statutes and that liability-limiting 
language performs a similar function to proximate cause). 
 195. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of L.A. 
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 196. See, e.g., Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(citing cases). 
 197. For example, the courts have tried to clarify the McDonnell Douglas test for more 
than forty years. The major U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting McDonnell Douglas in 
chronological order are McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976);  
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The courts should abandon cat’s paw doctrine while it is still in 
its infancy. It will be impossible to reconcile a restrictive view of the 
doctrine with numerous Supreme Court cases. Indeed, these cases 
demonstrate that the courts did not need a separate cat’s paw 
doctrine to resolve cases. 
More importantly, it is easy to predict that cat’s paw doctrine 
will draw the courts into decades of legal battles about what falls 
within the doctrine and what does not. Indeed, courts are currently 
trying to define who counts as a supervisor, whether supervisory 
status is the correct limit, and what a person with bias needs to 
intend to potentially create liability. Unfortunately, most of these 
questions do not help us answer whether a person faced unequal 
treatment because of a protected trait. 
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